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1989-1994 40I. Introduction
This paper analyzes the interdependence between the implementation of a non-
inflationary monetary policy and the transformation of the banking systems in Eastern
Europe. These reform areas actually represent two sides of the same coin. While monetary
policy is concerned with the provision of an optimal money supply to an economy - given the
structure of money demand -, banking system reform has important implications for both, the
structure of money demand as well as for the transmission of monetary impulses. The conduct
of a successful monetary policy depends on the stability of structural parameters that are at
least partially being determined through the financial system. At the same time, the success of
banking system reform, i.e. the improvement in the efficiency of financial resource
allocation, is affected by the stability of the monetary system. Monetary stability is crucial for
an efficient allocation of resources because price signals should not be disturbed by high and
volatile inflation rates which make it difficult to separate shifts in relative prices from
movements in the general price level.
Facing the dilemma that monetary policy in order to be effective needs stable financial
markets, and vice versa, the basic contention of this paper is that monetary stabilization and
banking system reform have to be initiated simultaneously while taking feed-back effects
between the two policy areas into account. Hence, the paper identifies the channels of inter-
action and describes policies which mitigate negative feed-back effects. The following second
part identifies problems with the choice of intermediate targets for monetary policy during the
transformation process in general as well as in the presence of distortions in the financial
markets. The third part asks which policy instruments can be implemented under conditions
of financial market imperfections and how these should be designed in order to avoid nega-
tive effects on the efficiency of financial resource allocation. The fourth part assesses the re-
forms that have been implemented in the monetary systems of the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland against this framework. The fifth part concludes.
n. Monetary Policy in Emerging Financial Markets
This chapter outlines general problems associated with the choice of intermediate tar-
gets. It does not intend to answer the question which intermediate target would be optimal for
the emerging market economies. More specifically, the obstacles to implementing a policy of
monetary targeting during the transformation process are shown. These obstacles are divided
into those that stem from the instability of money demand and from the control of money
This research has been conducted in the framework of a research project on financial
market reform in Eastern Europe. Financial support of the Volkswagen-Foundation is
gratefully acknowledged.supply by the monetary authorities. The last section of this chapter summarizes to what extent
frictions and imperfections in financial markets affect the conduct of monetary policy and
outlines criteria that characterize a non-distortionary policy.
The conduct of monetary policy during the transformation from plan to market re-
quires both, the definition of appropriate targets for monetary policy as well as their imple-
mentation. Monetary policy assumes an active role in macroeconomic management for the
first time after decades of having passively followed the requirements of the real production
plan. By separating the monetary circuits of households and firms, by regulating the exchange
of cash into non-cash money, and by synchronizing credit and production plans, central plan-
ners could almost perfectly monitor and control monetary flows. As a consequence, they had
no need to acquire knowledge about the structure of money demand, the determinants of
money supply, and about the channels through which monetary impulses were transmitted
into prices. Whatever the ultimate goal of monetary policy was, it could be reached fairly di-
rectly, and there was no need to specify intermediate targets. Not always, however, did the
authorities succeed in synchronizing real money supply and demand. In the context of ad-
ministratively fixed prices did an excess of money supply over money demand not necessarily
lead to an increase in the absolute price level but, instead, to a monetary overhang; The resul-
ting disequilibrium in the goods market was characterized by shortages of consumer goods,
the disequilibrium in the money market led to forced savings, i.e. to high (involuntary) hol-
dings of financial assets.
1
Feltenstein and Ha [1993] provide estimates for the size of the monetary overhang in
the Czech Republic and in Poland in the 1980s. They find a significant amount of repressed
inflation in Poland which became smaller towards the end of the decade. Price liberalization
in die Polish case caused inflation to increase to almost 600 % in 1990, thereby eroding the
monetary overhang. For the Czech Republic, in contrast, no large difference between official
prices and black market prices and thus no large monetary overhang could be found. The
Czech authorities could obviously, by keeping administrative macroeconomic control fairly
tight, align money supply and demand under central planning. Hence, price liberalization in
the Czech Republic led only to relatively moderate rates of inflation if compared to other re-
form countries. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the case of Hungary where official
prices had already been somewhat liberalized prior to the final overhaul of central planning.
The remainder of this paper will therefore deal with implementation problems for monetary
policy after any existing monetary overhang has been taken care of.
Note that it is difficult to assess the true amount of this monetary overhang. It may, for
example, have been rational for consumers to hold relatively large stocks of cash as
transaction balances because consumer goods became often unexpectedly available and
because non-cash balances could not immediately be converted into cash.1. Choice of Intermediate Targets
Upon the abolition of central planning the need emerges to define intermediate targets
for monetary policy, provided that the price level cannot be targeted directly. In general, four
different types of intermediate targets are conceivable. These are the volume of money
supply, the prices at which gold or foreign currency are convertible into domestic currency,
interest rate variables such as the nominal market rate or the real interest rate, and other vari-
ables such as GDP [Lindsey/Wallich, 1992, p. 744], The problem with all these intermediate
targets is that they encounter severe measurement and information problems. The real interest
rate, for example, can only be measured if the price expectations of the public are known. Be-
cause markets for futures from which the inflationary expectation could be derived do not
exist at the beginning of the reform process, measurement problems prohibit the use of the
real interest rate as a monetary policy target. Other variables such as GDP are typically mea-
sured with a considerable time lag and, again, cannot be used as operational targets. In addi-
tion, it holds for all potential intermediate targets of monetary policy that the transmission
from monetary impulses into prices is to a substantial degree determined by the institutional
arrangements on financial markets. It is the stability of the structural parameters which un-
derlie monetary policy and their volatility which determine whether monetary aggregates, in-
terest rates, or other variables should be chosen as intermediate targets. Because of the in-
stability of these parameters in the transformation process, a country may choose to abandon
an independent monetary policy entirely and to tie its currency to foreign (stable) currency.
This option has become known as a currency board arrangement which combines a fixed ex-
change rate with a rule-based monetary policy.^ By definition, the monetary authorities under
such a regime do not have to search for appropriate intermediate targets or for ways to im-
plement these.
The choice of an intermediate target can be based on the magnitude of financial and
real shocks in an economy. The interest rate is superior to a monetary target if disturbances
affect only money demand (financial shocks) but not the relationship between interest rates
and nominal spending (real shocks). During the transformation process, however, the clear
separability between these two options is not given. Even if the monetary authorities decide to
target the money supply instead of interest rates, they should raise real interest rates to posi-
tive levels. Negative real interest rates heavily distort the allocation of resources because they
discourage savings while encouraging borrowing and are therefore typically accompanied by
administrative restrictions on credit allocation. In addition, during the transformation from
plan to market, real as well as financial shocks are occurring simultaneously, with their
See Buch et. al. [1995] for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of fixed
exchange rate regimes.magnitude being hard to determine empirically. Khan and Sundararajan [1992] therefore pro-
pose to utilize a basket of targets and instruments. Hilbers [1993] argues that at the beginning
of the transformation process, when the banking system is still highly monopolized and when
budget constraints are weak, directly controlled quantitative targets should be preferred over
interest rate targets. . „
The optimality of an intermediate target also depends on its implementability.
Cukierman [1994, pp. 1442] distinguishes between targeting the price level or a monetary ag-
gregate. He proposes to let the choice of a target depend on its controllability and the trans-
parency. While the monetary base may be controllable for the monetary authorities, it may
lack a transparent relation to prices. The price level, instead, is a transparent target but lacks
controllability - especially during the transformation process. Hence, he proposes the choice
of a wider monetary aggregate as an intermediate target as a reasonable intermediate solution.
The following section looks at problems with the monetary targeting more closely.
2. Problems with Monetary Targeting
2.1. Instability of Money Demand
The basic assumption of the standard approach of monetary targeting is that the
structural parameters which determine the transmission of monetary impulses into prices are
stable. In this respect, the stability of money demand - i.e. the stability of the income velocity
of money - is of key importance [Neumann/von Hagen, 1987]. Underlying this concept is the
quantity equation which relates changes in prices (P) to changes in money supply (M), velo-
city (V), and output (Y):
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Velocity is a function of income, nominal interest rates (i) - which determine the opportunity
costs of holding money ~, and the expected price level (P^). Variables that have a positive
impact on money demand lower the velocity of money because the average holding period of
each currency unit rise. Conversely, higher opportunity costs of holding money lower money
demand and raise velocity. Nothing can be said a priori about the optimality of a specific
monetary aggregate as an intermediate target. This choice depends on the stability of money
demand for this aggregate and, thus, on the stability of the transmission of monetary impulses
into prices. A given expansion of money supply leads to different degrees of price increases
All variables are expressed in logarithms, reflecting percentage changes.depending on the structure of money demand. If, for example, the income velocity of money
increases because agents try to evade the inflation tax and thus reduce their money holdings, a
given increase in the money supply is going to result in a larger rise of prices.
Generally, shifts in money demand can have two different causes [Khan/Sundararajan,
1992]. One-time structural shifts occur if administrative restrictions are abolished. Because
decisions of banks and non-banks in the socialist banking system were highly regulated by di-
rect controls on the holdings of certain monetary aggregates and on interest rates, agents are
likely to adjust their portfolios to the desired composition after these controls are lifted. This
implies that the money demand functions that could be estimated for the pre-reform period do
probably not reflect the true preferences of the market participants. Hence, the monetary
authorities would have no knowledge about the structure of the true money demand, even if
that relationship had remained unaffected by the transformation process itself. More realisti-
cally, however, the structure of money demand itself will change during transformation, i.e.
the elasticities of money demand with respect to income or interest rates will change. Inciden-
tally, a hardening of the budget constraints of enterprises during the transformation process
will lead to an increased interest elasticity of money demand from the corporate sector. These
considerations imply that monetary targets would have to be adjusted to shifts in money de-
mand. Once a target has been set and money demand increases in an unexpected, yet perma-
nent way, sticking to the original target would lead to an overly restrictive monetary policy,
and vice versa.
Measurement of velocity is, in addition, complicated by two transformation-specific
factors. First, private sector activity is often not fully reflected in national production statis-
tics. If private sector production is contributing an increased share to total output, actual GDP
rises over measured GDP. As a consequence, measurement of velocity by only taking mea-
sured GDP into account will lead to an underestimation of true velocity. Another, second,
factor leads to an overestimation of true velocity. If a greater transaction volume is settled
with interenterprise debt as a means of payment, measured income velocity of the money
stock increases. Hence, central banks may react with a tightening of money supply, thus re-
ducing enterprise liquidity even more, and stimulating a further increase of interenterprise
debt. In general, because the magnitude of the underestimation of GPD and of the amount of
interenterprise debt are unknown, monetary authorities may react to a perceived change in
money demand while the true structural parameters have remained unchanged.
2.2. Control of Money Supply
Once an optimal growth rate of the money supply which - assuming a given structure
of money demand - is consistent with the inflation target of the central bank has been calcu-lated, the question arises whether the central bank can actually implement this rate. In this
context, two complications arise. The central bank may encounter difficulties in controlling a
specific monetary aggregate because some of the determinants of this aggregate are beyond
its control. As this is typically the case, the central bank also has an information problem as it
cannot readily observe the actual level of the money stock. The bank can thus react to a de-
parture from the optimal growth rate only with a lag and may run an overly excessive or re-
strictive policy during the interim period.
Central banks can determine the money supply by influencing the level of base money
(H) which affects the level of total money supply (M) through the money multiplier (mm):
: p/> -4-1
[2] M = mmH = H; H = C+RR + ER
cc+rr+er
where cc = the ratio of currency c to total deposits in the banking system, rr (er) = the ratio of
required (excess) reserves (RR and ER) to total deposits.
4 The central bank has a fairly direct
influence only on the monetary base which is composed of a domestic component plus fo-
reign exchange reserves. By changing the reserve requirements of commercial banks or by
applying other instruments that affect the reserves of the banking system, the central bank can
to some extent control the domestic component of the monetary base. Controllability is rela-
tively low, however, if, for example, excess reserve holdings are high such that changes in the
required reserve ratio leave the total base money unaffected because banks will simply con-
vert excess into required reserves. Goodhart [1994] notes that the domestic monetary base is
also beyond the complete control of the monetary authorities because the guaranteed con-
vertibility of bank deposits into cash forces the central bank to accommodate changes in the
public's demand for cash. These unexpected changes in cash demand are particularly high
during the early reform period when the separation between cash and non-cash monetary cir-
cuits is lifted and when the seasonal pattern of the demand for cash is unknown as yet.5 The
foreign component of the monetary base is controllable only if a system of flexible exchange
rates or if capital controls are in place [Fry, 1978], In a fixed exchange rate system without
This exposition of the money multiplier is, of course, a very simplified one because it
does not consider different kinds of deposits and/or different required reserve ratios. See
Willms [1993] for a detailed derivation of the money multiplier which takes these
specifications into account.
A different argument against monetary base targeting does not apply to the situation of
the reform countries just because excess reserve holdings are high. Under the condition
that commercial banks can optimize on their excess reserve holdings, Goodhart argues
that excessive interest rate fluctuations will be observed. At the end of each day banks
would offer excess reserves on the interbank market - driving interest rates down - or
borrow deficient funds at the central bank's penalty rate - driving interest rates up -,
respectively.capital controls, changes in the demand for domestic money will automatically transmit into
changes of foreign exchange reserves.
Even if the central bank has fairly tight control over the supply of base money, how-
ever, it cannot control the overall money supply because the latter depends on the money
multiplier, that is on the behavior of banks and non-banks. The central bank does have a di-
rect influence only on the ratio of required reserves to deposits. It may raise the required re-
serve ratio if it intends to absorb excess liquidity in the banking system or lower it if the tax
that a reserve requirement imposes on banks is considered too high. As far as the other two
components of the money multiplier are concerned, the central bank has both, a control and
an information problem [Neumann/von Hagen, 1987].
The control problem emerges because changes in the demand for currency of house-
holds as well as in the excess reserve holdings of banks cannot be predicted accurately.
Households will decrease their cash holdings if more interest bearing financial assets become
available, thus raising the opportunity costs of holding cash. The introduction of new pay-
ment techniques may, in addition, reduce the transaction demand for money. There is also no
more need to hold cash balances for the purchases of rationed consumer goods. Hence, cash
demand can be expected to decline during the transformation process. As a further result of
this process, banks will increase their excess reserves if they wish to increase their liquid as-
sets and if no other liquid investment opportunities are available. This may occur, for ex-
ample, if the quality of the asset portfolio of the banks deteriorates due to the presence of
non-performing loans. Even if these (voluntary) excess reserve holdings remain unchanged,
involuntary excess reserves may increase due to inefficiencies in the payments system and
due to problems with calculating minimum reserves. If the payments system is organized by
the central bank, excess reserves would reflect the float that originates from settlement delays.
Hence, while excess reserves may in general be expected to decline during the transformation
process due to a re-organization of the payments system, temporary upswings may occur as a
response to a lack of liquid investment opportunities.
An information problem arises because the central bank can observe the behaviour of
the money stock only with a time lag. Whereas the monetary base comprises liabilities of the
central bank that are by definition readily observable to the bank, the money stock consists of
liabilities of the banking system. In order to observe the actual money stock, the central bank
thus depends on information that it receives from the commercial banks. During the transfor-
mation process, this kind of information is likely to be inaccurate and delayed. The accoun-
ting system and thus the definition of monetary aggregates in the socialist banking system dif-
fered markedly from the accounting standards in a developed market economy. After these
accounting standards have been adjusted to Western rules, people need time to implement the10
changes. As a consequence, the compilation of monetary and banking surveys typically con-
sumes a considerable amount of time. In the interim period, however, reliable data on the be-
havior of monetary aggregates is not available. Because the shift to a completely new ac-
counting system cannot be achieved over night, accounting standards tend to be adjusted
gradually. This implies that even the post-reform period data sets may not be entirely consi-
stent.
6 The result are quite substantial delays with which information on the monetary pro-
cesses is. available for monetary policy makers.
While these control and information problems are also common to developed market
economies - where, nonetheless, they tend to be less pronounced than in transition economies
- another control problem emerges particularly during transformation. This control problem
is due to the close interaction between monetary policies and quasi-fiscal activities which may
force the central bank to refinance insolvent banks and enterprises [Bofinger, 1994]. Bofinger
argues that part of the money supply in transition economies is endogenously determined by
the need to keep insolvent firms, i.e. firms which total costs exceed total revenues, liquid. It
should be noted that this particular control problem is not of a technical nature as the one
above but rather a consequence of the underlying political and institutional structure of the
economy. It is assumed that the central bank cannot credibly commit itself to the announce-
ment of a monetary target which disregards the financing needs of insolvent firms. In other
words, firm managers and the government have sufficient influence over the process of
money creation to ensure that the liquidity demands of the industry are being met.
There are essentially two different, albeit related, channels through which money
supply can become endogenous. The first channel is that insolvent firms are financed directly
by the monetary authorities. Loans to enterprises may be channelled through the banking
system but are essentially earmarked for special recipients. Hence, these credits are indirect
subsidies - or part of the quasi-fiscal deficit. The reason for this more or less direct financing
of loss-making firms is the political desire to support certain sectors of the economy. This un-
dermines the independence of the monetary authorities and weakens the traditional role of
commercial banks. Banks have no incentive to assess the creditworthiness of a borrower and
to monitor the efficient use of funds. The allocation of directed credits may be thought of as a
first step which leads to a build up of non-performing loans on the balance sheets of banks
and thus to banking distress. Hence, a second channel emerges if insolvent banks are kept
liquid through refinancing facilities of the central bank even if the quasi-fiscal activities have
At the end of 1991, for example, the National Bank of Poland introduced new reporting
rules for Polish commercial banks which primarily intended to exclude accrued but not
yet due interest as well as certificates of deposits of the National Savings Bank from
money supply. As a consequence, the reported volume of M2 fell by about 7% [Chopra,
1994].11
been fully consolidated into the budget. Banks which receive low-interest refinancing credit
can continue to credit insolvent firms because they do not have to fear bankruptcy. Further-
more, they are likely to continue lending to loss-making firms if they see a chance to recover
past losses [Perotti, 1993]. Through this channel enterprises do not directly receive central
bank credit as a substitute for government subsidies. It may rather be in the interest of the
monetary authorities to refinance the insolvent banks because, regardless of political consi-
derations, the authorities assign a positive weight to the stability of the banking system as
such. Hence, the solvency of the banks determines monetary policy. The more fragile the
banking system, the less able are the monetary authorities to risk its stability by allowing
bank bankruptcies. This endogenous component of the money supply is thus the larger the
greater the share of insolvent banks which is dependent on central bank refinancing.
3. Institutional Structure of the Banking System
The prediction, control, and information problems with respect to money demand and
supply as well as the potential endogeneity of the latter are to a large extent the result of the
institutional structures of the banking systems in the emerging market economies. These fac-
tors hamper an effective monetary targeting. In a similar vein, interest rate targeting is ham-
pered by the lack of responsiveness of market participants to price signals.
Hilbers [1993] distinguishes four stages in the transformation of financial systems
from plan to market. In a first stage, the monobank system has formally been split up into a
two-tier system. Centralized financial planning is still performed, leaving the complete insti-
tutional set-up of the monobank system in place. In a second phase, central planning is abo-
lished and prices are liberalized. The institutional structure of the financial system, however,
adjusts slowly to the changes in macro-economic policy. Hence, the banking system con-
tinues to be segmented, banks remain state-owned, nominal interest rates are gradually in-
creased but real interest rates may turn negative on average, and banks hold excess liquidity
due to weak interbank markets and insufficient payments systems. Monetary financing of the
government deficit may still occur because the tax system needs time to be built up and be-
cause government expenditure cannot be reduced immediately. A lack of liquid secondary
markets for government securities and for other financial assets prevents the conduct of open
market operations. Legal restraints, in addition, may hamper the provision of assets as collat-
eral for rediscount lending. The third stage is characterized by increased financial liberaliza-
tion, i.e. increasing competition, privatization of banks, and market-determined interest rates,
together with regained macro-economic stability. The turnover and the liquidity of interbank
markets increase and secondary market for securities emerge. Hence, budget constraints of
banks are hardening, excess reserve holdings decrease, and the potential for open market ope-12
rations increases. The fourth stage is that of a developed market economy.^ The relevance of
the institutional factors that hamper the conduct of monetary policy decreases while econo-
mies move from stage one to. four: Generally, these factors can be grouped into five catego-
ries.
The inefficiency of the payments system, particularly in stage two will lead to long
payment delays and to a large float. Hence, excess liquidity in the banking system will be
high and difficult to predict [Balino et al., 1994]. In this situation, monetary authorities face
difficulties with determining and influencing the liquidity needs of the banking system, and
the'monetary base may not be affected by traditional instruments of monetary policy. As was
mentioned above, total commercial bank reserves which are being held with the central bank
may not be affected by changes in the required reserve ratio because excess reserves can
simply be converted into required reserves.
An additional problem which complicates the conduct of a market-based monetary
policy are soft budget constraints of banks and enterprises. Prior to privatization and to the
implementation of a bankruptcy legislation, banks and enterprises are unlikely to react to
price signals. In other words, money demand is interest inelastic. A policy which aims at
limiting the amount of liquidity in the system by raising the interest rate for central bank
credits would thus be ineffective. Ultimately, however, the introduction of hard budget con-
straints is a function of the monetary policy itself and, more importantly, of the willingness of
the government to stop subsidization of certain sectors of the economy and to implement
structural adjustment procedures such as privatization and the enforcement of a bankruptcy
law. Hence, the argument that the presence of soft budget constraints hampers the implemen-
tation of a restrictive monetary policy is somewhat contradictory because an expansionary
monetary policy is one important cause of budget softness.
The substitution of bank credit by supplier credit as a particular indicator of budget
softness has been described as one mechanism which counteracts restrictive monetary policies
[Abel/Siklos, 1994; Calvo/Coricelli, 1994]. Upon a tightening of central bank credits, enter-
prises can obtain additional liquidity by falling into arrears with their suppliers. The presence
of a weak legal system may, in addition, prevent firms from enforcing their claims on bad
customers. If suppliers need time to find new, solvent customers, the trade credit that they
grant is involuntary, leading to a large network of interfirm debt obligations. In this situation,
Although no clear borderlines between these four stages can be drawn, the more
advanced Eastern European reform states such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland have probably reached the third stage in the institutional development of their
financial markets. Most successor states of the former Soviet Union, however, would still
have to be placed in the second stage, while some have not even abolished all tools of
central planning.las Instifrufrs fur
it is almost impossible to separate insolvent from illiquid firms and hence to decide whether
an increase in interenterprise debt is an adjustment to levels which arc being observed in mar-
ket economies or rather a reflection of budget softness. It has already been mentioned above
that the occurrence of interenterprise debt complicates the interpretation of observed velocity
and hence an appropriate reaction to changes in it. But interenterprise debt affects monetary
policy also through a different channel. Although interenterprise debt is not part of the tradi-
tional money stock, it may be monetized by the monetary authorities. Firms will actually
gamble on this option the more frequent bail-outs have been in the past or, more generally,
the less credible an initial monetary tightening has been. In this sense, interenterprise debt
adds an additional layer to the endogeneity of money supply described above. Again, the
question is whether budget softness complicates monetary policy or if not monetary policy it-
self causes budget softness. In any case, policy makers should monitor the development of
interenterprise debt. It is, however, not advisable to include interfirm debt into the calculation
of the money stock because the central bank has no means to affect the volume of trade credit
in an economy by use of its monetary instruments. Interenterprise debt is entirely inside
money, i.e. liabilities of the private sector. The central bank, in contrast, influences money
supply by creating outside money, i.e. by issuing its own liabilities.
As far as the use of the interest rate as an intermediate target is concerned, the struc-
ture of the interbank money market and of the banking system as such has an impact on the
ability of the central bank to influence the interest rate level in the economy. In most of the
formerly centrally planned economies, the banking sectors are highly segmented. While most
deposits are held with the savings bank, this bank often lacks investment opportunities.
Hence, the savings bank offers excess liquidity on the interbank market where, again, only a
few large banks exercise effective demand. As a consequence, the interest rate on the inter-
bank market may not be an appropriate guideline for the central bank to set its lending rate.
Whether the interbank rate would lie above or below the competitive rate depends on the
relative strength of the actors on that market. As the savings bank can act as a monopolistic
supplier of funds, the interest rate is likely to lie above the competitive market rate.
8 If this
situation emerges and if the central bank takes the interbank rate as the lower bound for its
own lending rate, banks which may be able to borrow under competitive terms may not re-
ceive liquidity. Hence, the creation of a liquid, competitive interbank market, together with a
strengthening of competition, should be one immediate goal in the transformation of the
monetary and financial systems. In addition, the dominance of the savings bank on the market
for deposits may counterwork effects at raising deposit rates to positive levels in real terms.
In the absence of market access to foreign financial markets for depositors, the savings bank
It is also conceivable that the banks which are in the need of liquidity form a demand
cartel and push the price below the competitive market rate. Setting central bank lending
rates at or above this rate would thus lead to an excessive supply of liquidity.14
may adjust nominal interest rates only insufficiently with respect to inflation. Competition
from the other large domestic banks which could drive up deposits rates will be limited. Prior
to recapitalization, these banks have to struggle with large portfolios of non-performing loans
and can thus not afford higher costs of refinancing.
The institutional deficiencies in the financial markets of the emerging market econo-
mies do not only affect the structural parameters that underlie monetary policy making - and
hence the choice of appropriate intermediate targets. These deficiencies also hamper the ef-
fectiveness of the instruments of monetary policy, i.e. its the operative objectives. While it
may be necessary to rely on fairly direct instruments of monetary control at the beginning of
the transformation process simply because the effects of more sophisticated instruments are
unknown or because economic agents are unlikely to react to market signals, those monetary
instruments should be chosen that are the least likely to have negative feedback effects on the
efficiency of financial markets. Instruments that fulfil these requirements would be those that
(a) have limited impact on relative prices, i.e. any potential influence of the central bank on
interest rates and operating costs should not favor or discriminate against certain banks, (b) do
not preserve oligopolistic market structures, (c) do not have a direct influence on the alloca-
tion of credit across different sectors and borrowers, and (d) provide the commercial banks
with incentives to engage in an active liquidity management. In other words, while the insti-
tutional structure of the banking and financial system affects the choice of policy instruments,
those instruments should be chosen that do not preserve these institutional weaknesses. The
following part introduces a general classification scheme for instruments of monetary policy
and briefly applies this reasoning to the traditional instruments.
Illi Choice of Instruments
A general classification of instruments of monetary policy has been proposed by
Lindgren [1991] who first distinguishes between direct and indirect instruments. Direct in-
struments are those which directly control the volume of credit or money, respectively, or the
level of the interest rate. Hence, credit and interest rate ceilings as well as restrictions con-
cerning the maximum allowed interest rates spreads of banks fall under this category. Indirect
instruments, in contrast, influence the liquidity conditions of banks and - in a more indirect
sense than interest rate controls - the interest rate level of an economy. Indirect instruments
can again be split into two groups. Statuary indirect instruments (reserve requirements) result
in a reallocation of costs among banks and may thus distort relative prices. Market-based in-
direct instruments (rediscount facilities, open market operations), in contrast, affect the li-
quidity of the banking system by inducing the banks to change their asset structure volun-
tarily and as a reaction to price signals. Generally, the move from stage one to stage four in
the institutional development of financial systems should entail a shift from direct instruments15
to indirect, market-based instruments of monetary control [Lindgren, 1991;
Khah/Sundararajan, 1992; Hilbers, 1993].
1. Direct Instruments
Credit and interest rate ceilings have been the traditional monetary instruments under
central planning.^ By earmarking funds to be lent to specific sectors of the economy, by de-
termining the deposit and lending rates as well as the interest rate spreads of commercial
banks, and by separating monetary circuits central planners had great control over monetary
flows. After the introduction of a two-tier banking system, control of the monetary authorities
over lending and interest rate policies of the commercial banks weakened. The process of
money creation now depends on the change of the money multiplier, credit decisions are be-
coming more and more autonomous, and central banks cannot readily observe all decisions
and actions of commercial banks. This also implies that monetary authorities loose control
over the implementation of direct instruments.
1.1. Interest Rate Ceilings
Interest rate controls specify the minimum (maximum) nominal interest rate for cer-
tain kinds of deposits (loans). Instead of determining loan and deposit rates separately, the
maximum allowed interest rate spread may be fixed. Under central planning, interest rate
controls fixed rates below their equilibrium levels, leading to an excess demand for loanable
funds and thus to disequilibrium credit rationing. Hence, in order to stimulate deposit supply
and to suppress loan demand, interest rate controls should be abolished from an allocative
point of view. Quick interest rate liberalization, however, may negatively affect the solvency
of banks which carry low-interest loans on their books. These banks now have to refinance
long-term, low-interest loans at higher costs. In this situation, Mathieson [1980] proposes to
gradually decontrol interest rates and to constrain competition from outside banks which are
not burdened with low-interest assets. An alternative strategy would be to relieve banks from
the burden of the past by recapitalizing them early on [Buch, 1994b]. This strategy has the
additional advantages to free human resources which otherwise would be needed to fine-tune
gradual interest rate adjustment, to establish market-determined interest rates, and to promote
competition.
Note that these restrictions were - under central planning - maintained within the
monobank system whereas instruments of monetary policy in a two-tier banking system
are instruments that the central bank uses to influence asset arid liability positions of
commercial banks.16
1.2. Credit Ceilings
Hilbers [1993] distinguishes four types of credit ceilings. Positive selective ceilings set
upper limits for specific types of credits and are typically introduced because of prudential
considerations, aiming at the stabilization of the banking system. Banking regulations, for
example, may specify that loans to one single borrower may not exceed a maximum share of
total loans granted by,a bank (maximum exposure) or that one large credit may not exceed a
certain multiple of the equity base of a bank;
1
0 Negative selective ceilings, in contrast, are
usually implemented with the intention to finance specific firms or regions by setting lower
limits for loans to be granted to these sectors. Hence, directed credits are a typical form of
negative selective ceilings. These directed credits should be phased out and be replaced by di-
rect government subsidies because they typically bias credit allocation towards large, state-
owned borrowers.
Another distinction can be made between gross and net ceilings. Gross ceilings specify
the overall volume of credit in an economy, being tied to the total capital stock or the assets
of the banking system or of individual banks. Lending beyond these ceilings is not allowed
even if banks have raised additional funds. Net ceilings, in contrast, allow banks to increase
their lending over and beyond the ceilings, provided that they have sufficient long-term funds
available. Irrespective of which form of credit ceilings is being chosen, one condition for its
implementation is that compliance can be observed and that non-compliance can be pena-
lized. Hence, the need to establish effective reporting and legal systems is independent of the
form of policy instrument chosen.
There are two reasons why it may be necessary to impose or maintain credit ceilings,
respectively, during the transformation process. In the presence of binding credit ceilings,
banks tend to hold large excess reserves. The immediate effect of an abolition of credit cei-
lings may thus be a temporary credit surge, leading to upward pressure on prices. This ad-
justment reflects a one-time shift from disequilibrium to equilibrium on the market for loan-
able funds and will not lead to, permanent inflationary pressure. Hilbers [1993] has argued
that prior to the removal of credit ceilings, excess liquidity should be removed from the sy-
stem by inducing banks to invest into government securities - if available - or by raising
reserve requirements. Provided that excess liquidity can be contained by these measures,
stock adjustment processes would not require the maintenance of credit ceilings.
A second argument which focuses on flow aspects emerges if banks have incentives to
lend to related entities and to roll-over loans to insolvent borrowers [Begg/Portes, 1993;
Although positive selctive ceilings may feed back into monetary policy they are not of
concern in this paper.17
Schmieding/Buch, 1992; Bofinger, 1992]. These incentives may lead to an uncontrollable
supply of credit and thus undermine monetary and financial sector stability. In such a situ-
ation, credit ceilings can be maintained until nonperforming loans have been removed from
the balance sheets of banks, until banks have been privatized and/or their budget constraints
have been hardened. One negative implication of these credit ceilings is that they freeze mar-
ket shares if the overall credit expansion is divided up among the existing banks. Schmieding
and Buch [1992] therefore propose to apply credit ceilings only to large state-owned banks
while allowing private banks to expand their lending - and thus their market shares. Experi-
ence from Eastern Europe, however, has shown that this proposal needs to be subjected to one
major qualification. In many cases, loans that have been granted by private banks have turned
out as likely to be non-performing as loans granted by the state-owned banks [Buch, 1994b].
It could be argued whether this development may justify the imposition of credit ceilings on
private banks as well. However, due to the fairly small market shares that private banks have
and thus because of the limited macroeconomic implications of their lending, together with
the ultimate goal to promote private banking, this seems not a reasonable step. Instead, pru-
dential regulations are the appropriate means to promote financial stability.
2. Indirect Instruments
2.1. Reserve Requirements
Minimum reserve requirements specify a certain percentage share of each deposit
which commercial banks have to hold in an account with the central bank. These reserves are
typically non-interest bearing assets. Banks which do not comply with the reserve require-
ment can usually borrow deficient funds from the central bank at a penalty interest rate.
Minimum reserve requirements increase the costs of financial intermediation through the
penalty rate and through the opportunity costs of holding non-interest bearing reserves. Be-
cause reserve requirements reduce the amount of loanable funds that banks have available,
banks will adjust their asset portfolios as a response to changes in reserve requirement.
Whether credit supply decreases by the full amount of the reserve requirement or by less than
this amount depends on the way reserve requirements are calculated [Baltensperger/Milde,
1987, pp.70].
1
1 If the deposit base at the beginning of the period is used as a reference for
calculating the reserve requirement, loan supply decreases in proportion with the higher re-
serve requirement. If, however, the deposit base at the end of the period determines the
It should be noted that one situation is conceivable when higher reserve requirements
have no impact on loan supply. This will be the case if excess reserves are as high as to
fully cover the minimum reserve requirement.18
magnitude of the reserve requirement, loan supply decreases less than proportionally. ^ The
reason is that banks at the beginning of the period are uncertain about both, the actual level of
their reserves as well as the actual reserve requirement at the end of the period. Both depend
on the amount of (stochastic) deposit withdrawals during the period. If withdrawals are high,
both reserves as well as minimum reserve requirements will decrease. Required reserves thus
serve as a buffer against liquidity shocks. A system where banks have to meet reserve re-
quirements ex post and over average holding periods therefore promotes the liquidity ma-
nagement of banks.
Reserve requirements give central banks some control over the monetary base. Even
in developed market economies, where banks' liquidity management is quite sophisticated, do
central banks therefore retain the minimum reserve instrument. In the transformation process
minimum reserves might, in addition, be considered as a source of revenue for the govern-
ment budget. If commercial banks do not receive interest payments on their accounts with the
central bank, while the bank can re-invest the reserves into interest-bearing assets, central
bank profits rise with the reserve requirement. Hence, Fry [1988, pp. 108] proposes to impose
discriminatory reserve requirements on different types of financial assets, depending on their
interest sensitivity, in order to maximize central bank profit or government revenue, respec-
tively. This second-best strategy obviously requires knowledge about the structure of money
demand which is, for reasons outlined above, not given during the transformation process.
More importantly, however, differential reserve requirements impose differential taxes on fi-
nancial assets and thus distort relative prices of these assets. Minimum reserves, in general, by
raising the costs of financial intermediation lead to higher spreads and thus cet. par. to lower
savings and investment. These cost effects differ for different types of financial assets if non-
uniforrri reserve requirements are imposed. If, for reasons of an improved monetary control
and in order to obtain fiscal revenue, reserve requirements are to be maintained, they should
be as uniform as possible, i.e. apply to all banks and to all kinds of deposits equally.
It should be noted, in addition, that minimum reserves are a rather inflexible instru-
ment of monetary control because changes in reserve requirements trigger substantial portfo-
lio adjustments [Lindgren, 1991]. Reserve requirements should thus be maintained at a pre-
annoiiriced level and not be used for monetary fine-tuning. In order to reduce the financial
The argument that reserve requirements may lead to an increased credit supply and thus
to more investment cannot be applied to the transformation process. If the funds that are
taken from the banks in the form of minimum reserves are invested into (productive)
sectors which do otherwise not receive finance from the commercial banks, overall output
may rise as a consequence of the imposition of the minimum reserve [Fry, 1988].
Especially in the context of the reform states of Eastern Europe, however, it is hardly
conceivable that central banks engage in such an efficient re-allocation of financial funds.19
burden that minimum reserves impose on banks, interest may be paid on reserves, provided
that the fiscal situation allows this.
2.2. Refinancing and Interest Rate Policy
Central banks can influence the level of base money through their refinancing policies,
i.e. through the conditions under which commercial banks can receive central bank credits.
There are three policy parameters that the central bank needs to set in the context of its refi-
nancing policies. First, the central bank must specify the assets that it is willing to accept as
collateral for the provision of credit. Second, quantitative ceilings for central bank refinanc-
ing for the banking system or for individual banks may be set. At a pre-fixed interest rate,
ceilings on lending may lead to rationing of central bank funds.
The third parameter is the central bank refinancing rate. The lower benchmark for this
rate is an interest rate level which results in a positive real market rate. Central bank refinan-
cing at negative real interest rates is equivalent to granting a subsidy to the recipient com-
mercial bank which, in turn, can make profits from investing low-interest central bank funds
into assets with non-negative rates of return such as, for example, foreign currency deposits.
Negative real interest rates are, in addition, usually combined with the administrative alloca-
tion of credit, further aggravating resource mis-allocation. It should be noted, however, (i)
that to the extent that nominal interest rates on long-term loan contracts cannot be adjusted
flexibly, (ii) that some sectors continue to receive subsidized loans, and (iii) that inflationary
expectations are wrong, (ex post) average real refinancing rates often remain negative for a
considerable amount of time even if the ultimate goal of the central bank is to raise real inter-
est rates to positive levels.
Provided that positive real interest rates can be established, finding an appropriate
level is a complicated task in the economies in transition because competitive money market
rates which could be used as a benchmark cannot be observed.
1
3 Hence, world interest rates,
adjusted by a country-specific risk premium may be applied. As money market turnover and
competition on this market increase,
1
4 observed interest rates on these markets can be used as
a lower bound for central bank refinancing. If refinancing rates are set below market rates,
demand for central bank credit is in principle unconstrained because banks can make use of
arbitrage opportunities. By setting the interest rate on refinancing credit above the market
rate, central banks open a lender of last resort facility for (temporarily) illiquid banks. If bor-
rowing at this rate is in principle unconstrained - or only conditioned upon the provision of
See Leite and Sundararajan [1990] for a discussion of how to determine the adequacy of
interest rates.
See section II.2. for a discussion of this issue.20
collateral -, the central bank's objective of price stability, i.e. of keeping money growth on; a
pre-determined path, may temporarily become subordinated to the objective of financial sta-
bility, i.e. of providing illiquid but solvent banks with liquidity [Cukierman, 1994, pp. 1444].
Obstacles to the implementation of a refinancing policy which corresponds to the goal
of price stability during the transformation process are the soft budget constraints of banks,
the lack of assets which can serve as collateral for central bank lending, and the degree of fi-
nancial distress of banks, combined with the lack of information on the solvency of banks.
Budget softness of banks or a lack of profit-orientation implies that an increase in refinancing
rates may not restrain credit demand. The lack of collateral has often led central banks to
auction off credit instead of requiring the provision of collateral. Again, budget softness of
banks may cause problems because banks may bid up interest rates over and above the market
rate and may ultimately fail to repay their debt. The last obstacles to a market-base refi-
nancing policy, the degree of financial distress, cannot be overcome with the tools of mone-
tary policy alone. Instead, in order to be able to base its lending decision on criteria of credit-
worthiness and to eventually close insolvent banks, the central bank must expand its supervi-
sory activities. ^ A comprehensive solution to the issue of banks distress can only be found in
cooperation with the government and in the context of a recapitalization program which com-
prises elements that prevent a re-occurrence of financial instability.
2.3. Open Market Operations
The increased reliance on open market operations in government securities and in
other financial assets represents the final stage when moving from the use of direct to
indirect, market-based instruments. By buying securities from commercial banks, the central
bank can expand the supply of base money and, hence, the money supply, and vice versa.
This can be achieved either by fixing the amount of securities to be bought, leaving the price
to be determined by the market, or by fixing the price, leaving the quantity as the endogenous
variable. Obviously, the implementability of open market operations depends on the depth
and liquidity of secondary markets for securities. Because these markets are rather
underdeveloped and thin in the emerging market economies, open market operations can be
mimicked by quasi-open market operations, i.e. by trades that take place on primary markets.
Considering the time that is needed to establish efficient secondary market, the necessary
reforms should be initiated at the beginning of the transformation process in order to allow
the conduct of open market operations later on.
Alternatively, the central bank may delegate banking supervision to an independent
institution with which, nonetheless, close co-operation as far as the exchange of data is
concerned must be arranged.21
To sum up, a monetary policy which is consistent with the criteria outlined at the end
of chapter 2, should comprise the following elements:
— quick decontrol of interest rates
— maintenance of net credit ceilings for large state-owned banks until budget constraints
have been hardened
— unification of reserve requirements and - possibly - payment of interest rates on reserves
— elimination of preferential central bank refinancing rates and special lending programs
— granting of refinancing credit on the basis of solvency and/or the provision of collateral
— promotion of the development of the interbank money market and of the securitization of
financial claims.
IV. Experience of Eastern Europe
This part summarizes the experiences that the early reform states of Eastern Europe,
i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, have made with the conduct of monetary po-
licy and with the move from direct to indirect instruments of monetary control. Throughout
the presentation of the empirical evidence, the focus is on the monetary policy instruments
that have been used and their impact on the operations of banks. Institutional factors such as
the degree of central bank independence, the structure of the financial and the banking sy-
stem, and the optimality of a chosen monetary policy are not discussed.
1. The Czech Republic
Between 1990 and 1994, the Czechoslovakian National Bank and the Czech National
Bank (CNB),
1
6 respectively, tried to target the growth rate of the money stock M2 (Table 1).
Only for 1991 was no official monetary target announced [Hanousek et al., 1994], The ex-
change rate and an incomes policy were used as nominal anchors. This over-determination of
monetary policy has led to conflicts of interest, especially in 1994 when increased capital in-
flows boosted the foreign component of the money stock (Table 2). While in 1992 and 1993
net foreign assets contributed less than domestic assets to the growth of the overall money
stock, growth of M2 in the first half year of 1994 was almost entirely the reflection of an in-
crease in foreign assets. Net domestic assets stayed almost unchanged. Their structure, how-
ever, has shifted away from credit to the government towards credit to enterprises and house-
holds. Within the latter category, a significant re-allocation of resources away from the public
towards the private sector has taken place. From 1992 onwards, lending to state-owned firms
has declined in absolute terms, while lending to private firms increased at above-average
1
6 The abbreviation CNB is used even if - for the time before 1993 - the State Bank of
Czechoslovakia is meant.22
rates. Of course, these shifts also reflect the effects of the voucher privatization. As a conse-
quence, the share of private sector credit in total credit rose from 12.23 % at the end of 1990
to 46.63 % in June 1994. Banking distress has put little financial pressure on the monetary
authorities. Total bank recapitalization at the amount of 56 bn Krowns has been financed
from privatization proceeds and the issuance of bonds of the National Property Fund. In ad-
dition, emergency credit to financial institutions amounted only to 1 bn Krowns at the end of
1993.










A Velocity of M2
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Actual realization in brackets. — a) January-June. — b) Change over same period of
previous year. — c) In brackets; first number = consumer prices, second number = producer
prices. — d) Estimated by Planecon.
Sources: Quarterly and Annual Reports of the State Bank of Czechoslovakia and the Czech
National Bank, various issues; Planecon, Czech Monthly Economic Monitor (June
1994); Hanousek et al. [1994].
As regards the uses of M2, the share of time and savings deposits continuously in-
creased while holdings of Ml and of foreign currency deposits became less important (Table
2). The important contribution of demand deposits to the growth of M2 in 1993 is a reflection
of the fact that people shifted their financial assets away from currency into deposits during
the time of the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics. It was expected that bank de-
posits would be converted at a more favorable rate than currency holdings from Czechoslovak
into Czech Krowns. Due to this shift from currency into time deposits, commercial banks ac-
cumulated high excess liquidity. By raising reserve requirements and reducing auction credit
volume, the CNB tried to sterilize this liquidity in the first months of 1993.23
























































































Sources: Quarterly and Annual Reports of the State Bank of Czechoslovakia and the Czech
National Bank, various issues; IMF, International Financial Statistics, various
issues; own calculations.
Large swings of money demand, i.e. of the income velocity of money, especially du-
ring the time surrounding the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republic, hampered mone-
tary targeting (Graph 4). While in 1991-1993 the income velocity of M2 displayed some sea-
sonal pattern, evidenced by a decline in velocity in the fourth quarter, no trend can be de-
tected. This is one reason why both in 1992 and in 1993 actual growth of M2 surpassed the
targeted rate; the annualized growth of the money stock in the first half of 1994 with respect
to the same period of the previous year was already well above the target for M2. In response
to its inability to target to money supply, and because of a limited impact of refinancing rates
on market interest rates, the CNB in 1994 decided to target banking system reserves both on
an aggregate and bank-specific level.24
,i; The CNB gradually shifted from the use of direct to indirect instruments of monetary
control. Interest rate ceiiings which limited commercial banks' loan rate to the discount rate of
the Central Bank plus a maximum spread were in place between January 1990 and April
1992. The maximum spread was increased from 8 % in 1990 to 14 % in the first half of 1991
and then lowered to 7.5 %. In early 1992, credit ceilings were imposed on banks on the basis
of the monetary program for the following quarter. These ceilings were removed for small-
and mid-sized banks in July and for large banks in October of the same year. In many cases,
banks voluntarily did choose not to exhaust the credit limits. Parallel to the gradual phasing
out of direct credit controls, the CNB has introduced indirect instruments such as credit auc-
tions, lombard, and rediscount credit. Yet, while central bank lending to financial institutions
was cut down between 1991 and 1993 (Table 13), the share of market-based refinancing in
total central bank credit has remained modest and even declined throughout the 1991-1993-
period (Table 3). Only in the first eight months of 1994 did refinancing credit increase rela-
tive to total central bank lending. The bulk of outstanding central bank credit to commercial
banks is redistribution credit, despite the fact that no new redistribution credit has been
granted since mid-1991. Hence, the increase in the share of redistribution credit in overall
central bank lending in 1992 and 1993 is a result of a less than proportional reduction of this
item. More then half of the redistribution credit at the end of 1993 was owed by the Consoli-
dation Bank, which had been founded to take over non-performing loans from the commer-
cial banks. In part as a response to reduced overall central bank lending, commercial banks
have increasingly utilized customer deposits as a source of refinancing. The ratio of central
bank lending to total deposits of financial institutions decreased from 38.1 % in 1991 to



















Table 3 — Lending of the Czech National Bank to Commercial Banks, 1990-1994.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994*
Change in Central Bank Lending [bn Krownsj
Total + 59.6 -14.0
Refinancing credit +35.1 + 9.1
Redistribution +19.5 -23.1
credit
Composition of Central Bank Lending [%]
Total 100 100




Source: Hanousek et al. [1994]; Selected Indicators of Monetary and Financial Develop-
ments in the Czech Republic [July 1994]; own calculations.
As regards the interest rate policy of the CNB, four episodes can be distinguished
(Graph I).
1? Between January and July 1992, central bank refinancing rates were substan-
tially below interbank deposit rates. In the second half of that year, the bank switched from
providing credit at these low rates towards granting short-term funds through credit auctions
at interest rates which highly exceeded the market level. Short-term auction credit, which was
the most important source of new central bank lending to commercial banks between July and
November 1992, was granted at a maximum interest rate of about 20 % while the market rate
was around 12 %. Similarly, the central bank auctioned off funds at interest rates well above
the market level in April 1993. The third period of interest rate policy starts roughly at that
time, continuing through the end of 1993, and is characterized by a lombard rate which is
roughly in line with the market interest rate, the deposit rate being set at about 6-7 percentage
points below that rate, and the auction rate at an intermediate level. Already during this pe-
riod, however, did the lombard and the auction rate have little practical relevance for the cost
of refinancing of commercial banks because hardly any new lending was done under these
facilities. This trend was even more pronounced in 1994, the fourth period. In the first six
months of this year no new lombard or auction credit was granted by the CNB, instead dis-
count lending increased at a rate of 21 % while total CNB claims on the financial sector re-
mained almost unchanged. Hence, through its discount window the central bank provided se-
lected banks with liquidity at below-market interest rates. The timing of the establishment of
Throughout the entire period did the stock of redistribution credit pay an interest rate
below the discount rate which was negative in real terms (Table 4).26
positive real refinancing rates depends on the choice of the interest rate as well as of the price
index (Table 4). If the auction rate and the producer price index are used, real refinancing
rates have been positive since 1992, based on the rediscount rate and consumer prices, non-
negative real rates could be reached only in 1994.















































the end of the
Sources: Planecon, Czech Monthly Economic Monitor (June 1994); Quarterly and Annual
Reports of the Czech National Bank, Hanousek et. al. [1994].
Overall, the monetary policy of the CNB is characterized by a drastic reduction of
central bank lending in 1992 and 1993, and a shift from direct to indirect instruments of
monetary control. Although being small in volume, preferential refinancing credit such as
rediscount lending seems to have become a permanent source of financing a very few, small
insolvent banks. Because there was no need to supply the economic system with additional li-
quidity in 1994 due to the large inflows of foreign reserves, not much can be said about the
success with the implementation of market-based instruments. At times, the CNB used dis-
crete changes of the mandatory reserve instrument (Table 14). Yet, this instrument was pri-
marily applied under the special circumstances of the separation from the Slovak Republic.
One reason for the success of the Czech monetary policy in terms of a reduction in inflation is
that the public sector has not imposed any restraints on the monetary authorities.
2. Hungary
The Hungarian National Bank (NBH) followed a mixed strategy both with respect to
its primary and intermediary targets. Apart from the goal to stabilize prices, the official an-
nouncement for the goals of monetary policy in 1991 mentions the maintenance of solvency
of the country and the improvement of the external position of the Hungarian economy as27
additional targets [NBH, Annual Report 1991, p. 75]. While the improvement of the external
balance was given priority over the price target in 1990-91, this order was reversed in 1992-
93 [NBH, Annual Report 1993, pp. 83]. In each year, a number of further targets such as the
improvement of the general investment conditions was added [NBH, 12:1992, pp. 16].
Generally, the stability of the real effective exchange rate of the Forint - measured by the
change in wholesale prices - as well as, in 1990 and 1991, the growth of the domestic credit
stock, were used as interim targets. In 1992 and 1993, no quantitative target was specified.
Instead, the reduction and stabilization of interest rates was envisaged. The exchange rate of
the Forint is in principle fixed but was devalued discretely several times since the inception of
reforms.
While money supply grew faster than predicted in 1990-1992, it remained below tar-
get in 1993 (Table 5). Money growth, however, did not transmit into increases of domestic
credit by the same order of magnitude. This can at least partially be explained by an attempt
of commercial banks to reduce their exposure to risky assets. Hence, domestic credit ge-
nerally grew slightly less than originally expected. Despite the deviation of money growth
from its expected rate, consumer prices in 1991 and 1992 increased roughly in line with ex-
pectations, while in 1992 they rose much faster. The increase of producer prices was over-
estimated only in 1992. The fairly close estimates for prices, however, should not hide the
fact that the structural parameters of the transmission of monetary impulses into prices have
shifted during the observed time period. Income velocity of broad money has fallen by 80 %
in 1992 and rose by 3 % in 1993.
1
8
in addition, it should be noted that expectations about the development of real GDP have
- with the exception of 1990 - been overly optimistic.28

































































Sources: NBH Market Letters, 1:1990; NBH Annual Report 1991 (pp. 74); NBH Monthly
Report 1992:12 (pp. 16); NBH Annual Report 1992; NBH, Annual Report 1993,
p. 86.
As far as the sources of the growth of the banking system's assets are concerned, the
situation differs considerably from the observations made for the Czech Republic (Table 6).
In Hungary, credits to government have made a substantial contribution to the growth of net
domestic assets since 1992 with a share of more than 50 %. Although bank recapitalization
with a total cost of 168 bn Forint or about 5 % of the banking system's net domestic assets at
the end of 1993 has been financed through the issuance of government bonds, it has raised the
financing needs of the budgetary sector. Credits to enterprises which contributed about 50 %
(24 %) to the growth of domestic assets in 1990 (1991), declined in absolute terms both in
1992 and 1993, and started to recover only in the first half of 1994.
1
9
In the case of Hungary, no information is available about the development of private and
state-owned sector credit.29
Table 6 — Sources and Uses of Assets, and Liabilities in the Hungarian Banking
System, 1990-1994.


















































































Sources: National Bank of Hungary, Monthly Reports, various issues; own calculations.
The interest rate policy of the NBH is characterized by two main tendencies
(Graph 2). First, the base refinancing rate of the NBH has over some periods of time been set
below the average yield on treasury bills, giving commercial banks the opportunity to borrow
from the central bank in order to invest into government securities [Pugh Piper et. al., 1994,
p. 14]. Profit opportunities of this kind arose in the first half of 1992 as well as between Sep-
tember and December 1993. Hence, the NBH has indirectly been financing the state budget
through its refinancing window and lost control over money supply. This window was closed
when the NBH raised its interest rate on repurchase agreements over and above the average
interest rate on treasury bills in early 1994. Second, despite efforts at establishing positive
real refinancing rates, which were reached in 1993 at the latest,
2
0 a number of preferential
refinancing rates such as on export trade and existence loans are maintained (Table 7). Export
trade credits, for example, were granted at annual interest rates of 10 % in 1991-1992, and
loans to refinance existence credits were granted at an annual rate of 13.2 % in 1992 and 3 %
20 The base refinancing rate of the NBH has been positive in real terms since 1991 if the
change of producer prices is used as a basis of reference and since 1993 if the change in
the consumer price index is used.30
in 1994. In September 1994, seven different preferential loan programs were still in place
[NBH, 1994:9].
Table 7— Refinancing Rates of the NBH and Price Developments in Hungary, 1989-
1994.









































Average interest rates per period. — a) January-June. — b) Price increase in the first six
months at an annualized rate. — c) Loans maturing over 180 days but within 1 year. —
d) Loans to refinance existence loans (75 % of base rate).
Source: NBH, Monthly Reports and Annual Reports; own calculations.
There is no detailed data available which would allow an assessment of the impor-
tance of preferential lending as a share of total central bank lending to commercial banks.
Data on the balance sheet of the NBH only allows a differentiation between short- and long-
term refinancing credit, repurchase, and rediscount lending. This data shows that in 1993 and
1994 the NBH' has increasingly made use of the repurchase agreements while cutting down
rediscount and general refinancing lending (Table 8).
2
1 The structure of refinancing credit is
increasingly dominated by long-term lending which has also increased in absolute terms.
Some of this lending are loans from abroad or from international financial institutions that the
NBH channels to the recipient firms. Using the National Bank as an agent of this kind, how-
ever, has at least two serious disadvantages. First, the NBH continues some commercial
banking functions which it should delegate to other, specialized financial institutions. Second,
long-term lending by the NBH is promoted. This runs counter to the goal that central bank
lending should, in the first place, even out short-term liquidity needs.
?!•• Repurchase agreements are based on the provision of T-bills as collateral, and on a fixed
interest rate.31
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Sources: NBH, Monthly Reports, various issues; own calculations.
Mandatory reserve requirement were actively used in 1990 and 1991 to reduce excess
reserves of commercial banks. However, this policy has only temporarily been effective
(Table 14). As the only country analyzed in this paper, the NBH pays interest rates on manda-
tory reserves although these interest payments were substantially lowered to only 2 % an-
nually in 1992. In addition, voluntary deposits held with the NBH pay interest rates not too
far below the market rate. Considering the payment services that these accounts can provide,
these interest payments create substantial incentives for financial institutions to hold excess
reserves with the NBH. From October 1992 onwards, however, no new interest bearing vo-
luntary deposits could be made. In view of this fact, the increasing share of excess reserve
holdings as a share of total commercial bank deposits with the NBH in the second half of
1992 and in 1993 is surprising.
In contrast to the Czech National Bank did the NBH constrain nominal lending to
commercial banks only in 1992 (Table 13). As one consequence has the reliance of commer-
cial banks on central bank credit as a source of financing remained fairly high. The ratio of
the liabilities to the NBH over total commercial banks' asset was reduced from 23.7 % in
1989 to 12.9 % in 1994 (June). It was then about twice as high as in Poland and in the Czech
Republic. Excess reserves of commercial banks are the highest in the region and have even
shown an upward trend in 1994. That may be a result of the policy to pay interest on reserves,
but is probably also reflecting institutional problems with the calculation of mandatory re-
serves and with the payments system. As far as the refinancing and interest rate poiicy of the
NBH is concerned, the high share of long-term lending as well as the existence of preferential32
loan programs are obstacles to the use of indirect, market-based instruments of monetary
control.
Table 9 — Sources and Uses of the Growth of Assets and Liabilities in the Polish
Banking System, 1989-1994.



















































































Source: International Financial Statistic, IMF; own calculations.
3. Poland
According to official announcements, the main task of the Polish National Bank
(NBP) has been the promotion of price stability [Osinski/Slawinski, 1994]. The variable that
the NBP used as an intermediate target between the beginning of the transformation process
and the year 1993 was the nominal growth of total money supply, including foreign exchange
deposits. However, no detailed information is available concerning the actual targets. Ob-
viously, money and credit expansion was constrained by the pre-announced crawling peg ex-
change rate which required the differential between domestic and foreign price increases to be
no larger than the planned nominal devaluation of the Zloty, should a real appreciation of the
currency be avoided. In 1993, the NBP started to use the short-term interest rate as an opera-
tional target. The interest rate that the bank uses for its repurchase and reverse repurchase33
agreements is determined on the basis of the pre-announced devaluation, foreign interest rate
developments, and interest rates on the domestic money market.
Apart from general problems with monetary forecasting during the transformation
process,
2
2 financing needs of the public sector are one main reason for the inability of Polish
monetary authorities to affect growth rates of money supply.
2-* Table 9 shows that net lending
to the government sector has been the most important source of money growth in 1992-1994,
while lending to state-owned enterprises dominated in 1989-1990. This indicates a shift from
financing the enterprise sector through directed central bank credits towards subsidization
through the budget (or through extrabudgetary funds which often depend on financing from
the budget). It should be noted that 1991, the shift from credit to state-owned enterprises to-
wards credits to the budget has primarily taken place within the last quarter. Hence, it coin-
cides with the Ministry of Finance taking greater control over the banking sector. Parallel to
the declining importance of lending to the enterprise sector, the share of private sector credit
in total domestic credit has increased from 5.2 % in 1989 to 59.2 % in 1994.
The refinancing rate of the NBP (Graph 3), i.e. the rate at which short-term loans and
central investment credits are granted, has been used as a reference rate by commercial banks
in 1990 and 1991. Commercial banks which intended to index loan contracts to inflation used
the NBP-rate as an official projection of inflation [Chopra, 1994, p. 30]. Throughout 1991
and most of 1992, the interbank rate exceeded the refinancing rate which means that central
bank refinancing could be obtained at below-market rates instead of reflecting the highest
cost of obtaining funds. Another interesting feature emerged in 1992 when the effective yield
on treasury bills exceeded the refinancing rate.
2
4 Commercial banks could thus make arbi-
trage profits by borrowing from the central bank and investing these funds into T-bills. In
1993, the Polish Ministry of Finance started to align the effective yield with the refinancing
rate and directly borrowed additional funds which the market was not willing to provide at
this rate from the NBH [Chopra, 1994, p. 25], Apart from other factors that may have in-
creased the demand for government securities, this profit opportunity induced banks to adjust
22 Income velocity is displaying both, seasonal patterns as well as trend movements
(Graph 5). In the fourth quarter of each year, velocity tends to increase slightly. At the
same time. Since early 1991, there is a trend of the velocity of Ml to increase and of M2
to decrease [Polanski, 1994, pp. 8].
23 it must be noted that the cost of bank recapitalization have not to a substantial degree fed
back into monetary policy because the bulk of the funds needed was financed from
foreign loans. However, in 1994, commercial banks received 12 trillion Zloty in liquidity
assistance which is equivalent to 9.6 % of the growth of NBP assets between January and
August 1994.
24 Note that this effect is obtained because the T-Bills were sold below face value, thus
raising the effective yield above the coupon rate.34
the structure of their asset portfolios towards the holding of government securities in general
and T-bills in particular (Table 10).



































Source: NBP, Monthly Information Bulletins, various issues; own calculations.
The timing of the implementation of positive real refinancing rates - after highly
negative rates had been realized in 1989 and 1990 - differs according to which price index
and which interest rate are being used (Table 11). Based on consumer prices changes, real re-
financing rates stayed negative until 1994, measured against producer prices changes, refi-
nancing rates were positive in real terms already in 1991. The real discount rate was negative
throughout if consumer prices are used as a basis of reference, and was positive with the ex-
ception of 1993 if computed with producer prices.








































a) Interest rates as of September 1994, inflation rates of August over August of 1993.
Source: NBP, Monthly Information Bulletin, various issues; own calculations.35
While the NBP has increased its nominal lending to the commercial banking sector in
1993 and the first half of 1994 (Table 13) quite opposing movements can be observed for the
various forms of refinancing credit, on the one hand, and credit which is disbursed through
open market operations, i.e. repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements, on the other hand.
Open market operations have, in the aggregate, been used to withdraw liquidity from the
banking system whereas lending under the various refinancing programs increased in nomi-
nal terms. If one sums up the total amount of liquidity that the NBP has withdrawn from the
banking system in 1993 and in the first half of 1994, this adds up to an amount of 232,727
billion Zloty while the total amount of new refinancing credit that has been granted during
this time only adds up to roughly 20 % of this sum (48,971 Zloty by June 1994).
2
5 Because
most refinancing credit is in the form of central investment credit, an increase of nominal
credit outstanding mostly reflects capitalized interest payments.
As regards the structure of central bank receivables from commercial banks, two ob-
servations can thus be made (Table 12). First, refinancing credit as a share of total financial
sector receivables increased sharply from 35 % in 1990 to about three-quarters of total central
bank lending since 1992.
2
6 Parallel to this development, second, the share of central invest-
ment credits in total refinancing credit has increased from one to two-thirds. These refinan-
cing credits are granted to finance investment in progress as well as for the capitalization of
interest [NBP, 12:1993, p. 11]. They are guaranteed by the government and some carry pre-
ferential interest rates, the difference to the market rate being covered by the budget. All in-
terest is capitalized and paid at maturity. In June 1994, the second most important source of
refinancing credit - apart from central investment credits - were current account facilities
(27%). Discount credits (2.8%) which primarily finance agricultural banks, repurchase
agreements (5 %), and lombard credits (1.1 %) play only a minor role.
These numbers have been calculated from Osinski/Slawinski [1994]. Note that the
balance sheet of the NBP gives a somewhat misleading picture of these processes because
most transactions have a maturity of less than one month and do thus not show up in the
end-of-the-month balances.
The marked increase in refinancing credit between 1991 and 1992 is a consequence of a
sharp reduction of non-specified receivables of the NBP from the commercial banks in
November 1992.36


































Source: NBP, Monthly Reports, various issues.
To sum up, the NBP increasingly relies on market mechanisms in affecting the liqui-
dity of commercial banks. This is evidenced by the fact that the volume of open market
operations by large exceeds the volume of central bank lending to banks under refinancing ar-
rangements. At the same time, central bank refinancing plays only a minor role in the total fi-
nancing of commercial banks because the share of central bank liabilities in total liabilities of
commercial banks declined from 37 % in 1989 to 7.9 % in June 1994 (Table 13). This im-
plies that centrally allocated investment funds do not to a significant extent influence the port-
folio decisions of commercial banks. However, subsidized central bank lending puts those
banks which obtain these funds at a competitive advantage over those banks which do not re-
ceive low-interest refinancing. Because the discount window is primarily open to banks in ru-
ral areas, subsidized lending may serve as a barrier to the market entry of new banks into
these markets.37
V. Conclusions
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland each experienced the expected problems
with implementing monetary policy during the transformation process. While the central
banks had initially announced the intention to target specific monetary aggregates, they
switched to interest rate and other targets later on. Yet, meeting any target has proven diffi-
cult because of the inability to forecast the development of structural parameters underlying
the transmission of monetary impulses. The endogeneity of money supply as a consequence
of the financial needs of loss-making enterprises seems not to have been a major concern if
only direct central bank lending to firms is considered. Equally, the liquidity needs of insol-
vent banks have not severely constrained monetary policy because recapitalization programs
could largely be financed from privatization proceeds, from foreign loans, or through the is-
suance of government bonds.
2
7 In Hungary and Poland, however, increasing financing needs
of the official budgetary sector have counteracted restrictive monetary policies and potentially
contributed to the crowding out of private sector investment.
.The reform process is characterized by a gradual switch from direct to indirect instru-
ments of monetary control in all three countries. Initially, direct instruments were used for
different reasons. Interest rate ceilings were often maintained at the very early stages of re-
forms as a legacy from central planning. These ceilings - such as limits to the interest paid on
households deposits - were thus phased out quickly after the introduction of market-based fi-
nancial systems. Other interest rate regulations (maximum spreads, limits to the degree of in-
dexation) did instead restrain the pricing policy of banks, intending to shield borrowers from
high interest rates. In contrast, the main reason why credit ceilings were introduced in the
Czech Republic and in Poland was the intention to limit overall credit growth by restricting
lending of the largest banks and thus the growth of overall money supply. While this goal was
reached in the Czech Republic, money growth in the Polish case was substantially influenced
by credit demands of the budgetary sector. Because this credit demand was also met by
central bank lending, credit ceilings for commercial banks proved ineffective with respect to
containing money growth.
The monetary authorities increasingly relied on indirect, market-based tools since
1992/993. The timing of this switch is similar for all three countries although in Hungary and
Poland banking sector reform had started earlier than in the Czech Republic. The develop-
ments show that creating the institutional framework for a market-based monetary policy
consumes quite some time and should be initiated early on. Despite the progress being made
This is not to say that selective bail-out operations of the central banks may not have
promoted moral hazard, thus distorting incentives in the commercial banks system.38
in reducing the monetary-policy-induced distortions of the banking systems, at least four
areas remain to be addressed.
First, the level of taxation that minimum reserves requirements impose on the com-
mercial banking systems of Hungary and Poland as well as - in the case of demand deposits -
in the Czech Republic remains very high and contributes to high interest rate spreads. Do-
mestic banks which have to meet these requirements are thus put at a competitive disadvan-
tage over foreign banks abroad that have to comply with home country regulations. In addi-
tion, because reserve requirements differ for domestic and foreign currency deposits, savings
in domestic currency are discouraged.
Second, apart from the already high level of minimum reserves, commercial banks
hold substantial amounts of excess reserves. Because deposits with the central banks do pay
below-market interest rates, these excess reserves are the result of inefficiencies in the pay-
ments system and of insufficient flexibility in the calculation of minimum reserves.
Third, commercial banks continue to rely on central bank refinancing as a source of
finance to a quite substantial degree. Even in the Czech and Polish cases where the share of
liabilities to the central bank in total liabilities of commercial banks is comparatively low, it
was yet twice as high as in a developed market economy like Germany.
2
8 For some segments
of the banking system, notably the beneficiaries of preferential loan programs, these ratios are
even higher. Hence, the deposit base that commercial banks can actively utilize needs to be
broadened. The central banks can support this process by reducing minimum reserve
requirements and by reducing the need for high excess reserve holdings.
Fourth, the central banks do maintain subsidized lending facilities, albeit at different
degrees. In the current situation, phasing out these programs would probably not put the
overall stability of the banking systems at risk. It would, however, raise the credibility of the
central banks not to bail out commercial banks in the future.
See Table 13. In Germany, the average ratio of central bank liabilities to commercial
banks' assets (deposits) was 3.8 % (5.1 %) in 1988-92 [Deutsche Bundesbank,
Statistische Beihefte - Bankenstatistik, Monatsberichte].39
Table 13 — Indicators of Commercial Bank Liabilities and Receivables from the
National Bank in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, 1989-1994.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
a
Growth of Central Bank Lending to Financial Institutions [% change over the respective
period of the previous year]
Czech Republic ... 52 - 8.0 -17 - 41 0.5
Hungary 11.8 39 17.5 -29.7 25.7 4.6
Poland 457 251 -1.3 - 35 30.1 2:4


























Excess Reserves of Commercial Banks [in % of total deposits with the Central Bank]
Czech Republic ... ... ... 42 40 27.4
Hungary 68.3 75.3 65.9 60.9 69.7 74.9
Poland 88.1 38.6 35.8 40.5 28.5 24.8
a) June. — b) In brackets: liabilities to the Czech National Bank over total deposits of
clients of commercial banks. — c) Data for 1989-90 and for the following years is not
entirely comparable.
Sources: Hanousek et al. [1994], Monthly and Quarterly Reports of the National Banks,
National Bank of Hungary, Annual Report 1993, Selected Indicators of Monetary
Development in the Czech Republic, various issues, IMF, International Financial
Statistics, various issues; own calculations.40





















































a) 1989: primary crown deposits. — b) In February-May 1993, reserve requirement for
large banks were raised to 12 % for demand and 4 % for time deposits. — c) September.
Sources: Polanski [1994], Hanousek et. al. [1994], NBH Annual Reports, various issues,
NBP Monthly Reports, various issues.
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Graph 1 — Interest Rates in the Czech Republic, 1992-1994.
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Graph 3 — Interest Rates in Poland, 1990-1994.
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Sources: NBP, Monthly Information Bulletin, various issues.
Graph 4 — Income Velocity of Money in the Czech Republic, 1990-1993.
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Graph 5 — Income Velocity of Money in Poland, 1990-1993.
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Graph 6 — Income Velocity ofM2 in Hungary, 1988-1993.
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